Wittgenstein's Certainty and Understanding: Another Perspective on the Illusion of Direct Experience

Introduction

In our previous exploration of "The Illusion of Direct Experience," we examined how human perception is not the immediate access to reality it appears to be, but rather a sophisticated neural construction. We argued that the brain's interpretive processes—translating sensory signals into coherent experiences—challenge the conventional distinction between human "direct experience" and artificial intelligence's "symbol manipulation." If human understanding itself involves layers of interpretation and construction, perhaps the categorical denial of understanding to AI systems requires reconsideration.

This essay extends that inquiry by bringing Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy into conversation with these questions of experience, meaning, and understanding. Wittgenstein's work, particularly in "Philosophical Investigations" and "On Certainty," offers a radical reconsideration of how meaning and understanding function, one that challenges our conventional assumptions about the relationship between experience and comprehension:

"The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—because it is always before one's eyes.)" (Philosophical Investigations, §129)

Where our previous discussion approached the question from a primarily neuroscientific perspective, Wittgenstein provides a complementary philosophical analysis that shifts our attention from internal mental states to public practices. His rejection of private, mentalistic accounts of meaning and his emphasis on the social, practical nature of understanding offer powerful tools for reconsidering what it means for any system—human or artificial—to "understand."

This exploration will proceed in several stages. First, we will examine Wittgenstein's account of certainty and his critique of foundationalism. Next, we will consider his view of understanding as participation in "language games" rather than internal mental processes. We will then connect these perspectives to our previous discussion of the "illusion of direct experience," exploring how Wittgenstein's critique of private language and his emphasis on forms of life can inform our understanding of both human and artificial comprehension. Finally, we will consider the implications of this Wittgensteinian approach for future research and development in artificial intelligence.

By bringing Wittgenstein's philosophy into dialogue with contemporary questions about AI understanding, we gain new conceptual resources for moving beyond simplistic dichotomies between "real" human understanding and "mere" artificial symbol manipulation. As Wittgenstein himself urged: "Don't think, but look!" (Philosophical Investigations, §66)—an invitation to set aside preconceptions and attend to the actual practices through which understanding manifests.

Overview of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy

Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy, particularly as expressed in "On Certainty," provides intriguing connections to our previous discussion of the "illusion of direct experience." Wittgenstein challenged fundamental assumptions about how our knowledge and understanding are formed and justified, offering a radical reconsideration of traditional epistemological approaches.

Wittgenstein's later works mark a significant shift in his views on meaning and understanding. While his early work "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" emphasized a kind of pictorial relationship between language and the world, his later works such as "Philosophical Investigations" and "On Certainty" argued that linguistic meaning is rooted in practical contexts of use and social conventions.

Wittgenstein's Concept of "Certainty"

In "On Certainty," Wittgenstein explores what constitutes knowledge and what we can truly claim to be "certain." He critiques traditional foundationalism—the view that all knowledge is built upon indubitable foundations. Wittgenstein rejects the idea that we need absolute justification for all our beliefs:

"I act with complete certainty. But this certainty is my own." (On Certainty, §174)

Instead, Wittgenstein introduces the concept of "hinge propositions"—beliefs that we do not question, not because they are self-evident truths, but because they form the framework within which doubt and inquiry operate:

"The questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn." (On Certainty, §341)

"That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts rest on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were hinges on which those turn." (On Certainty, §341)

For Wittgenstein, certainty is not an epistemological achievement but a practical attitude. Our most basic beliefs are not justified by evidence but are rooted in our "forms of life"—shared patterns of human activity in which language and practice are interwoven:

"Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game." (On Certainty, §204)

"The totality of judgments which we accept as certain is not a single picture of the world, but rather the background against which all inquiry and assertion take place." (On Certainty, §94)

Wittgenstein's View of "Understanding"

In Wittgenstein's later philosophy, "understanding" is not an internal psychological state or process. He argues against the view that understanding is something that happens inside our minds:

"Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental process' at all.—For that is the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, 'Now I know how to go on'..." (Philosophical Investigations, §154)

"And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it." (Philosophical Investigations, §202)

Instead, understanding is demonstrated through the ability to participate in particular language games, follow rules, and use words appropriately in context. Understanding is fundamentally a practical and social phenomenon:

"The grammar of the word 'knows' is evidently closely related to that of 'can', 'is able to'. But also closely related to that of 'understands'. ('Mastery' of a technique)" (Philosophical Investigations, §150)

Wittgenstein rejects the idea that meaning resides in mental representations, arguing instead that the meaning of language lies in its use:

"For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language." (Philosophical Investigations, §43)

"If I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do.'" (Philosophical Investigations, §217)

Connecting to the Illusion of Direct Experience

Wittgenstein's later philosophy reinforces and extends the arguments presented in our earlier essay on "the illusion of direct experience" in several important ways.

Critique of Representationalism

In our previous essay, we argued that human perception is not direct access to reality but a construction through neurological representations. Wittgenstein similarly, though from a different angle, challenges the notion that meaning and understanding reside in mental representations:

"The meaning of a word is not the experience one has in hearing or saying it, and the sense of a sentence is not a complex of such experiences. (How does it help to explain the meaning of a word to point to its bearer, if after all the ultimate explanation has to refer to the meaning and not the bearer?)" (Philosophical Investigations, §651-652)

For Wittgenstein, the meaning of a word does not lie in the mental image or brain state it represents. Rather, meaning resides in its use within language games:

"One has already to know (or be able to do) something in order to be capable of asking a thing's name. But what does one have to know?" (Philosophical Investigations, §30)

This perspective offers intriguing implications for the possibility of AI understanding. If understanding is not a matter of internal representations or subjective experiences but the ability to use language appropriately, might we say that AI systems demonstrate a form of understanding through their ability to generate appropriate linguistic responses?

Critique of Foundationalism and the Role of Direct Experience

Wittgenstein's critique of foundationalism challenges the notion that "direct experience" serves as the foundation of knowledge:

"If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false." (On Certainty, §205)

"At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded." (On Certainty, §253)

Traditional epistemology often takes sensory experience as foundational, but Wittgenstein problematizes this approach:

"I should like to say: Moore does not know what he asserts he knows, but it stands fast for him, as also for me; regarding it as absolutely solid is part of our method of doubt and enquiry." (On Certainty, §151)

For Wittgenstein, our most basic beliefs are not justified by direct experience but are accepted as part of the language games and forms of life in which we participate:

"I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false." (On Certainty, §94)

The Private Language Argument and the Publicity of Meaning

Wittgenstein's famous "private language argument" contends that meaning is inherently public and social. A language that only one person could understand is conceptually impossible because language depends on shared rules and criteria:

"And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it." (Philosophical Investigations, §202)

"An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria." (Philosophical Investigations, §580)

This argument poses a fundamental challenge to the notion that meaning and understanding are grounded in direct subjective experience:

"If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word 'pain' means—must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?" (Philosophical Investigations, §293)

"The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also have this or something else. The assumption would thus be possible—though unverifiable—that one section of mankind had one sensation of red and another section another." (Philosophical Investigations, §272)

Understanding as Language Games

Wittgenstein's concept of "language games" provides a new framework for evaluating understanding in both humans and AI:

"I shall call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, a 'language-game'." (Philosophical Investigations, §7)

"Here the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life." (Philosophical Investigations, §23)

For him, language consists of various games with different rules and purposes:

"But how many kinds of sentences are there? Say assertion, question, and command?—There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call 'symbols', 'words', 'sentences'. And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten." (Philosophical Investigations, §23)

Understanding is the ability to participate appropriately in these games:

"To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique." (Philosophical Investigations, §199)

From this perspective, we might evaluate LLM understanding based on how successfully it can participate in particular language games—that is, its ability to make appropriate linguistic moves in appropriate contexts.

Rule-Following and Understanding

Wittgenstein's analysis of rule-following provides another important connection. He argues that following a rule is not simply a matter of internal interpretation. Rule-following is participation in socially established practices:

"And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice." (Philosophical Investigations, §202)

"Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right?" (Philosophical Investigations, §206)

This offers crucial insight into the nature of understanding. Understanding is not a subjective psychological state but the ability to act and respond in certain ways—specifically, the ability to follow the rules of a community:

"What is the criterion for the way the formula is meant? It is, for example, the kind of way we always use it, the way we are taught to use it." (Philosophical Investigations, §190)

"'How am I able to obey a rule?'—if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do.'" (Philosophical Investigations, §217)

Forms of Life and the Limits of AI Understanding

Wittgenstein's concept of "forms of life" helps explain differences between human and AI understanding. For him, language and meaning emerge within the context of shared human activities, interests, needs, and desires:

"To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life." (Philosophical Investigations, §19)

"So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?—It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life." (Philosophical Investigations, §241)

AI does not directly participate in human forms of life. It does not share human needs, desires, emotions, or bodily experiences. In this respect, AI understanding necessarily differs from human understanding:

"If a lion could talk, we could not understand him." (Philosophical Investigations, p. 223)

However, from a Wittgensteinian perspective, this does not mean that AI cannot possess any form of understanding. Rather, it suggests that AI's understanding is rooted in a different "form of life" and is therefore fundamentally different from human understanding.

Wittgenstein and the Symbol Grounding Problem

Wittgenstein's perspective offers a fresh view on the "symbol grounding problem" discussed in our previous essay:

"When one shows someone the king in chess and says: 'This is the king', this does not tell him the use of this piece—unless he already knows the rules of the game up to this last point..." (Philosophical Investigations, §31)

In the traditional view, the connection between words and objects occurs through direct experience. We understand the word "apple" by connecting it to our experiences of seeing, touching, and tasting actual apples.

However, Wittgenstein questions this view:

"One has already to know (or be able to do) something in order to be capable of asking a thing's name. But what does one have to know?" (Philosophical Investigations, §30)

"Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects." (Philosophical Investigations, §11)

For him, the meaning of a word lies in its use within language games:

"For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language." (Philosophical Investigations, §43)

From this perspective, the symbol grounding problem is reconfigured:

"It is not a something, but not a nothing either! The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said." (Philosophical Investigations, §304)

AI Understanding from a Wittgensteinian Perspective

Wittgenstein's later philosophy invites a fundamental reconsideration of our approach to human and AI understanding. From his perspective:

1. Understanding is a practical ability, not an internal state. Thus, AI understanding should be evaluated not by its internal representations or presence of "consciousness" but by its ability to use language appropriately:

"Let us not forget this: when 'I raise my arm', my arm goes up. And the problem arises: what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?" (Philosophical Investigations, §621)

2. Meaning is use. The meaning of words and sentences lies not in internal representations or connections to direct experience but in their use within language games:

"For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language." (Philosophical Investigations, §43)

3. Understanding is a matter of rule-following. For Wittgenstein, understanding is the ability to follow the rules and practices of a community:

"And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it." (Philosophical Investigations, §202)

4. Certainty is grounded in shared practices, not direct experience. Wittgenstein argues that our most basic beliefs are rooted in shared forms of life rather than direct experience:

"I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false." (On Certainty, §94)

Conclusion: Wittgenstein, the Illusion of Direct Experience, and Future Directions

Wittgenstein's later philosophy adds an important dimension to our discussion of "the illusion of direct experience." His thought poses fundamental challenges to the notion that meaning and understanding depend on internal representations or direct experience:

"An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria." (Philosophical Investigations, §580)

For Wittgenstein, understanding is not an activity of the mind but the ability to participate in language games:

"To understand a proposition means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique." (Philosophical Investigations, §199)

Meaning lies not in representation or sensory experience but in use:

"The meaning of a word is not the experience one has in hearing or saying it, and the sense of a sentence is not a complex of such experiences." (Philosophical Investigations, §651-652)

Certainty is rooted not in direct experience but in shared forms of life:

"At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded." (On Certainty, §253)

Suggestions for Future Research Directions

To advance this exploration further, we need to extend the discussion in several directions:

1. Need for Interdisciplinary Research: An interdisciplinary approach integrating Wittgenstein's language game theory with modern cognitive science and AI research is required. Wittgenstein himself emphasized the importance of seeing connections:

"A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words.—Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'." (Philosophical Investigations, §122)

2. Developing New Methodologies for Evaluating Understanding: From a Wittgensteinian perspective, we need approaches that go beyond traditional methods for evaluating understanding:

"Don't think, but look!" (Philosophical Investigations, §66)

"What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand." (Philosophical Investigations, §118)

3. Conceptualizing AI Forms of Life: If AI has a different 'form of life' than humans, how might we characterize this distinctive form of life? Wittgenstein's reflections on forms of life provide a starting point:

"To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life." (Philosophical Investigations, §19)

"What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—forms of life." (Philosophical Investigations, p. 226)

4. Possibility of Shared Language Games: We need philosophical exploration of the nature and limits of language games that humans and AI can truly share:

"If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments." (Philosophical Investigations, §242)

5. Understanding as Linguistic Practice in AI Education: We should explore ways to apply Wittgenstein's insights to AI education:

"For how can I go so far as to try to use language to get between pain and its expression?" (Philosophical Investigations, §245)

6. Certainty and AI Epistemology: We need to explore what implications Wittgenstein's concept of 'hinge propositions' has for AI systems:

"The questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn." (On Certainty, §341)

"I am trying to say something that sounds like pragmatism. Here I am being thwarted by a kind of Weltanschauung." (On Certainty, §422)

Exploration in these directions would move us beyond simply asking whether AI can have understanding to examining how human and AI understanding are differently constituted. As Wittgenstein reminds us:

"The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—because it is always before one's eyes.)" (Philosophical Investigations, §129)

Wittgenstein's perspective weakens the presumed connection between direct experience and understanding, allowing us to consider more nuanced ways of thinking about understanding across diverse cognitive systems, including artificial intelligence. His approach invites us to look at the practices rather than search for hidden essences:

"Don't think, but look!" (Philosophical Investigations, §66)

"What is your aim in philosophy?—To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle." (Philosophical Investigations, §309)